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Seminar
Department of Systems Engineering and Engineering Management
The
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Title: Duality Approach to Inventory Centralization Games
Speaker: Xin Chen, Assistant Professor
Department of Industrial and
Date : December 13th, 2006 (Wednesday)
Time : 4:30p.m. - 5:30p.m.
Venue : Room 513
CUHK
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Abstract:
Linear programming (LP) duality has played a fundamental role in the
analysis of cooperative games. In this lecture, we will present new
applications of LP duality and stochastic LP duality in studying cooperative
games arising from inventory centralization. In particular, we show that
duality theory can be used to prove the non-emptiness of cores for such
inventory games and to find an element in the core.
The first example is the economic lot-sizing game, in which multiple
retailers form a coalition by placing joint orders to a single supplier in
order to reduce ordering cost, which is assumed to be a concave function of
the order quantity. We are concerned with the issue of how to allocate the
cost/benefit so that it is advantageous for every retailer to join the
coalition. The standard formulation of the corresponding optimization
problem is a concave minimization problem and hence LP duality does not
directly apply. We suggest an integer programming formulation for this
optimization problem and show that its LP relaxation admits zero integrality
gap, which makes it possible to analyze the game using LP duality. We show
that there exists an optimal dual solution that gives rise to an allocation
in the core, which can be found in polynomial time. An interesting feature
of our approach is that, in contrast to the duality approach for other known
cooperative games, it is not necessarily true that every optimal dual
solution gives rise to a core allocation.
Another example is a single-period inventory centralization game with
stochastic demand where multiple retailers form a coalition by holding
centralized inventory in order to take advantage of the effect of risk
pooling. Again, we are concerned with the issue of how to allocate the
cost/benefit. When the ordering cost is linear, the optimization problem
corresponding to the inventory game is formulated as a stochastic program.
We observe that the strong duality of stochastic LP not only directly leads
to a series of recent results concerning the non-emptiness of the cores of
such games, but also suggests a way to find an element in the core. We
further construct a nontrivial infinite dimensional linear programming dual
for the well-known newsvendor problem with concave ordering cost and prove a
strong duality result for this non-convex minimization problem. This new
duality result immediately implies that the corresponding game has a
non-empty core. Finally, we prove that it is NP-hard to determine whether a
given allocation is in the core for the newsvendor game even in a very
simple setting.
This is a joint work with Jiawei
Zhang at
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Biography:
Prof.Xin Chen is an Assistant Profesor in the Department of Industrial and
Urbana-Champaign. He got his Ph.D. degree from the Department of
Operations Research, Massacheusetts Institute of Technology in 2003. After
that, he held a TA/Lecturer position in MIT from Fall 2002 to Fall 2003
and a Postdoctoral associate position in MIT from 2003 to 2004. He was an
Assistant Professor in the Dept of Mechanical and Industrial Engineering,
UIUC in 2004. Prof. Xin's research interests lie in the areas of
Production, Inventory and Supply Chain Management Optimization, Optimal
Stochastic Control, Computational Mathematics, Operations Research and
Operations Management. He published more than 20 papers in renowned
conferences and journals and a book, The Logic of Logistics by
Springer-Verlag in 2004.
*********************** ALL ARE WELCOME ************************
Host : Professor Chen, Youhua, Frank
Tel : (852) 2609-8310
Email : yhchen@se.cuhk.edu.hk
Enquiries: Peixiang Zhao or Jeffrey Xu Yu,
Department of Systems Engineering and Engineering Management
CUHK
Website: http://www.se.cuhk.edu.hk/~seg5810
Email: seg5810@se.cuhk.edu.hk
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