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**************************** Special Date *****************************
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Seminar
Department of Systems Engineering and Engineering Management
The
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Title: Decentralized Demand Management in Logistics Systems
and
Supply Chains
Speaker: Ms. Ozgun Caliskan Demirag
H.
Georgia Institute of Technology,
Date : December 15th, 2006 (Friday)
Time : 2:30p.m. - 3:30p.m.
Venue : Room 513
CUHK
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Abstract:
We analyze problems arising in the management of decentralized systems in two
application areas: sea cargo booking and automotive sales.
In the first part, we study a decentralized booking system where central
headquarters determines aggregate capacity for geographically-dispersed
agents who manage cargo bookings. We model agents' behavior with
network flow models and build these into an overall model to optimize
the capacities allocated to the agents. For the special case of a single route,
the optimal behavior of agents facilitates a mixed integer programming
formulation for the problem. For the NP-hard multiple route case, we analyze
several heuristics for the decentralized system that incorporate agent behavior.
We show that a decentralized system may perform arbitrarily worse than the
centralized system, although the choice of sales incentive may impact the
performance. We develop an upper bound that gives further insight on the
performance of the decentralized system, and we use numerical experiments
to test the heuristics.
In the second part, we analyze promotions in the automotive industry
where decentralization occurs as a result of the non-direct distribution
and sales channels of the car manufacturers. We study a game theoretical
model to examine the impact of “retailer incentive” and “customer rebate”
promotions on the manufacturer's pricing and the retailer's ordering/sales
decisions. We consider several models with different demand
characteristics and information asymmetry between the manufacturer and
a price discriminating retailer, and we determine which promotion would
benefit the manufacturer under which market conditions. We extend this
research by introducing competition among the manufacturers and retailers.
We provide several insights through numerical examples.
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Biography:
Ozgun Caliskan Demirag is a Ph.D. candidate in the H. Milton Stewart School
of Industrial and Systems Engineering at Georgia Institute of Technology.
Her research interests include supply chain management, logistics, and
operations-marketing interface. She received her Bachelor’s degree in
Industrial Engineering from
and her Master’s degrees in Operations Research and Industrial Engineering
from Georgia Institute of Technology in 2005.
*********************** ALL ARE WELCOME ************************
Host : Professor Li, Duan
Tel : (852) 2609-8323
Email : dli@se.cuhk.edu.hk
Enquiries: Peixiang Zhao or Jeffrey Xu Yu,
Department of Systems Engineering and Engineering Management
CUHK
Website: http://www.se.cuhk.edu.hk/~seg5810
Email: seg5810@se.cuhk.edu.hk
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