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Seminar
Department of Systems Engineering and Engineering Management
The Chinese
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Title |
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Warranty Costs Sharing
in a Supply Chain |
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Speaker |
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Prof. Fangruo Chen |
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MUTB Professor of International Business |
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Date |
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Nov. 10th, 2011 (Thursday) |
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Time |
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4:30 p.m. - 5:30 p.m. |
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Venue |
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Room 513 |
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William M.W. Mong Engineering
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(Engineering Building Complex Phase 2) |
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CUHK |
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Abstract:
We consider a supply chain where a buyer (manufacturer)
sources a component from multiple suppliers. The buyer uses the component to make
a product that she sells to end customers. When the component fails in the
field, warranty costs are incurred. We are interested in understanding how
the way the warranty expenses are shared among the buyer and the suppliers
impacts supply chain decisions and profits. In particular, two sharing rules
are considered. One is the Equal Sharing Rule (ESR), whereby the buyer pays
for a fixed percentage of the total warranty expenses with the remainder
equally shared by the suppliers. The other is the Target Sharing Rule (TSR),
whereby the buyer still pays for a fixed percentage of the total warranty
costs but the rest of the warranty expenses are charged back to the
originating suppliers of the defective components. The suppliers each exert
efforts to improve the quality of their product. Such efforts not only reduce
the total warranty costs but also generate larger market shares for the
effort-exerting suppliers. Therefore, the suppliers are engaged in a
multi-person game where each supplier independently chooses his
quality-improvement effort. Based on the equilibrium outcomes of the
suppliers’ game under both sharing rules, we provide conditions under which
the buyer prefers one sharing rule over another. We also show how the
comparison between the sharing rules changes if the buyer can set the
wholesale price to maximize her own profits. Finally, we compare the
performance of the decentralized supply chain with the centralized scenario
and provide conditions for supply chain coordination through proper warranty
costs sharing and wholesale pricing. Numerical examples are used to
illustrate various sensitivity analyses. |
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Biography:
Fangruo Chen is the MUTB
Professor of International Business at the Graduate School of Business,
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************************* ALL ARE WELCOME ************************
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Host |
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Prof. Zhou Xiang, Sean |
Tel |
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(852) 2609-8336 |
Email |
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Enquiries |
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Prof. Nan Chen or Prof. Sean X. Zhou |
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Department of Systems Engineering and Engineering
Management |
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CUHK |
Website |
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Email |
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